《逻辑哲学论》的言说悖论及其消解方式——对一种新路径的考察  

The Paradox and Solution in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:Investigating the New Reading

作　　者：赵瑞林[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西大学马克思主义哲学研究所,太原030006

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2013年第2期63-67,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"言说的困境:<逻辑哲学论>中的‘无意义’问题研究"(11YJC720061)

摘　　要：在《逻辑哲学论》的结尾部分,维特根斯坦宣称他写的所有命题都是无意义的,必须将之抛弃掉。既然是无意义的东西,为什么要还要费心书写?如何来理解维特根斯坦的这一悖论式言说,一直是学界悬而未决的难题。以戴尔蒙与科南特为代表的新维特根斯坦派以有别于以往的对"无意义"的诠释为突破口,重新面对《逻辑哲学论》中的言说悖论,为之提供了一种新的消解方式,开启了维特根斯坦哲学研究的新面向。文章将以科南特的思想为这种新路径的考察对象,阐释其理论要旨以及揭示其面临的理论困境。At the end of Tractatus Logico - Philosophieus, Wittgenstein claims that all of his propositions are nonsen- sical and must be abandoned. Now that the sentences are nonsensical, why has he written them.9 How to understand Wittgenstein＇ s paradoxical saying is yet unanswerable. In deputy of the New Wittgensteinians, Diamond, C. and Co- nant, J. have faced the paradoxical saying in a new way by uniquely interpreting the concept ＇ Nonsense＇. They have provided a solution to it and opened up a new path to studying the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Taking Conant＇ s thought as the object to be examined, this paper elucidates its theoretical property and discloses the theoretical di- lemma he is in.

关 键 词：《逻辑哲学论》 言说悖论 无意义 阐释 逻辑句法 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]