博弈论视角下新型农村合作医疗对农村居民医疗消费行为偏好影响分析  

Analysis of the Consumption Preferences of Patients Join in the New Rural Cooperative Medical System from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：徐珊珊[1] 高倩倩[1] 宁博[1] 李士雪[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学公共卫生学院,济南250012

出　　处：《中国卫生经济》2013年第3期50-51,共2页Chinese Health Economics

摘　　要：目的:分析新型农村合作医疗的实施对参合农民的医疗消费行为偏好和疾病经济负担的影响。方法以县医院为例,通过构建医生与患者的住院决策博弈模型,分析对于门诊可治愈,非必须住院治疗疾病医患双方的最优战略,并讨论不同情况下患者的疾病经济负担。结论大部分情况下,即使拥有住院补偿,住院实际支出仍高于门诊费用。患者仅因拥有住院补偿而选择住院治疗是不明智的。Objective： To analyze the variation of peasants＇ consumption preferences and economic burden of diseases under the operation of the new rural cooperative medical system （NCMS）. Method： Taking the county hospital as an example to analyze the optimal strategy of hospital and patients who could be cured by ambulatory treatment but don＇ t have to be hospitalized by building game theory model, and discussing patients＇ economic burden. Conclusion： In most cases, even the NCMS could provide part of the hospitalization cost, the actually expenses of hospitalization are also higher than ambulatory treatment. Therefore, it is unadvisable to choose hospitalization just for the only reason of hospital compensation.

关 键 词：新型农村合作医疗 卫生服务利用 博弈 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]