大电网省地电压调控的博弈收益函数建模  

Gawe Payoff Function Modeling for Game of Provincial and District Voltage Control in Large-Scale Power Grids

作　　者：张勇军[1] 李启峰[1] 张锡填[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东省绿色能源技术重点实验室华南理工大学电力学院,广州510640

出　　处：《电工技术学报》2013年第3期254-260,共7页Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(51147006)

摘　　要：提出了省地两级电网电压调控博弈的收益函数模型,由表征博弈双方所关注的调控效用和成本构成,以权重系数反映博弈方对效用或成本指标的关心程度,是博弈机制、主体对相关指标的关注程度及策略组合的函数。研究了博弈机制对收益函数的计算方法以及对策略组合的纳什均衡的影响,揭示了省地两级电压调控失配的博弈机理。通过对某区域电网的实际运行状态进行仿真计算,对比分析三种不同的博弈机制的纳什均衡。纳什均衡分析表明,解决省地电网电压调控失配问题的关键在于要改变对电压调控的考核指标及对其关注程度的认知,建立合理的合作机制,使得各主体的占优策略能够符合全网的趋优控制。A payoff function model which consists of the control effects and costs that concerned by both players is proposed for the game of Voltage control between provincial and district power grids. The payoff model, in which the weight coefficients reflect each participant＇s interesting degree towards control effects and costs, is the function of game institutions, interesting extents of participants towards the related indexes and strategy combinations. The influence of game institutions on calculation methods of payoff function and Nash Equilibrium is investigated to reveal the game mechanism of mismatch problem between the provincial and local grids. The Nash Equilibrium of three different kinds of game institutions is compared and analyzed through the simulation on a real regional power grid. The results show that the key of solving voltage control mismatch problem and making participants＇ dominant strategies in accordance with the optimization of the whole power system should be lain in changing the cognition in the interesting degree towards voltage control examining indexes and building a rational cooperative institution.

关 键 词：电网 电压调控 失配 博弈论 收益函数 

分 类 号：TM714.2[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]