批发定价权转移下的制造商促销与内生时机  

Manufacturer promotion and endogenous timing under transfer of wholesale pricing power

作　　者：刘军[1] 谭德庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2013年第7期6-10,23,共6页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.71271175);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(No.12YJC630096);四川省科技支撑计划项目(No.2011SZ0228)

摘　　要：在由单个制造商和强弱零售商组成的供应链中,给出三种博弈时机下的均衡结果求解过程,然后探讨定价权转移、促销转移,以及从众行为对均衡结果的影响;研究供应链的内生时机,并通过数值仿真探讨卖场流量对成员决策和内生时机的影响。研究结果表明:在三种博弈时机下,制造商通过促销转移能够与弱势零售商分享强势零售商的部分利润,此时从众行为降低了强势零售商利润;强势零售商领导是供应链内生时机,并且卖场流量不影响这种内生时机。Based on transfer of wholesale pricing power and consumers herd behavior, this paper gives solving processes of equilibrium results under three games timing, and then explores the effects of transfer of pricing power, promotional transfer and herd behavior on equilibrium results. Finally, it studies endogenous timing of competing supply chains, and explores the effects of operating costs and store traffic on member decision and endogenous timing through numerical simulations. The study shows that manufacturer can share some of dominant retailer＇ s profits with weak retailer through promotional transfer under three games timing. At this moment, dominant retailer＇ s profits decrease with the enhancement of herd behavior. Dominant retailer Stackelberg is endogenous timing of supply chains, which is affected by store traffic.

关 键 词：供应链 强势零售商 内生时机 定价权转移 卖场流量 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] F224.32[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]