转移支付、基础设施投资与腐败  

Fiscal Transfer,Infrastructure Investment and Corruption

作　　者：范子英[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2013年第2期179-192,共14页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:11YJC790039);武汉市社会科学基金一般项目(项目编号:11049)

摘　　要：腐败一直是转型经济体面临的主要问题,文章利用中国分省1995～2004年的数据,在综合考虑了其他因素后,发现中央针对各省的转移支付会诱发地方政府腐败,转移支付每增加1%,会使得地方的腐败立案数增加0.45%。文章还发现转移支付通过两个渠道对腐败产生影响:1)基础设施一直是腐败的高发领域之一,而转移支付会直接增加地方用于基础设施的投资,从而在绝对水平上增加地方官员的腐败机会;2)转移支付由于更加"廉价",还会降低地方政府对资金的监管力度,使得在相同基础设施投资的情况下,获得更多中央转移支付的地区,其实际发生的腐败会更多。文章同时还发现对外开放和效率工资能够缓解腐败,而民营化程度越高的地区腐败也越多。Corruption is a major problem that all transition economies face. Using Chinese provincial - level data from 1995 to 2004 and after considering other factors, this paper found that fiscal transfer payments from the central government to provinces will induce corruption of local governments, and an increase of 1% in transfer payments will increase corruption by 0.6%. We also found transfer payments play a role in two ways ： first, infrastructure is an area of high incidence of corruption, and transfer payments increase local investment in infra- structure directly, which then increases local officials＇ opportunities for corruption. Second, transfer payments also reduce local governments＇ oversight of investment funds, and then the actual occurrence of corruption is greater in provinces that receive more transfer funds but have the same amount of infrastructure investment. This paper also found that international trade and pegging wages to productivity would decrease corruption, but priva- tization would increase corruption.

关 键 词：财政转移支付 基础设施 投资 腐败 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]