央行独立性、国家信用冲突与币值稳定  

Central Bank’s Independence,National Credit Conflict and Currency Value Stability

作　　者：陈资灿[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学管理学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2013年第4期11-19,共9页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：价值稳定是货币充当计价与交换媒介基本职能的内在要求。实践已经证明,仅仅通过维护央行的独立性或约束国家货币发行的法制建设与实施,无法有效维护币值的长期稳定。在信用纸币时代,币值稳定受国家内在信用冲突影响,央行独立性受内生演变规律支配,是一个国家社会经济发展的结果与表现,呈现明显的状态依存特征。从长远看,主权国家币值稳定程度主要取决于国家自身在科技创新与制度创新过程中维护充分就业与可持续经济增长的能力。Value stability is the basic functions of inherent requirement that currency acts as valuation and medium of exchange. Practice has proved that, simply by maintaining the Central Bank＇ s independence or restraining national currency issue＇ s legal system construction and implementation, unable to effectively ＂＇safeguard the long - term currency stability. In the era of credit notes, currency stability influence by nation- al intrinsic credit conflict, and independence of the Central Bank dominated by endogenous evolution law, is the results and performance of a country＇ s socio- economic development, showing obvious state dependen- cy characteristics. In the long rtm, the sovereign state stability of the currency value depends largely on the country＇ s own ability to maintain full employment and sustainable economic growth in the process of techno- logical innovation and institutional innovation.

关 键 词：币值稳定 信用冲突 央行独立性 

分 类 号：F832.31[经济管理—金融学] F821