二维随机条件下不对称房地产双寡头期权博弈研究  

The Game Research of Asymmetric Estate Duopoly Option Under Two-dimensional Stochastic Conditions

作　　者：胡华[1] 纪少帅[1] 

机构地区：[1]宁夏大学数学计算机学院,银川750021

出　　处：《河南大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第2期115-119,共5页Journal of Henan University:Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61063020);宁夏研究生教育创新计划项目(2010)

摘　　要：通过建立二维随机条件下的不对称双寡头期权博弈模型,研究了当不确定性为多维时,投资密度和初始投资成本比例不对称对房地产投资决策的影响,对存在抢先均衡、序列均衡和同时均衡的情形进行分析,并结合数值案例进行说明.模型结果表明,较小的投资密度和投资成本比例都能降低投资阈值,使得投资企业具有更多的投资先机;交叉占优时两开发商均有机会抢先投资,相比较投资成本比例,开发密度对企业的投资临界值影响更大.Via the game model of asymmetric estate duopoly option under two-dimensional stochastic conditions, we made a research about how the asymmetry ratio of investment density and initial investment cost affect the investment decisions of real estate when uncertain factors are multidimensional with the analysis of the existed situations of preemption equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and simultaneous equilibrium, also with numerical examples to support our argument. The results of the model show that smaller ratio of the density investment and investment cost can reduce the investment threshold, which will make enterperises more opportunities; while cross- dominance, cross dominant both developers will have the opportunity to take preemptive investments. Compared to the proportion of investment costs, development density has greater impact on the threshold of enterprise investments.

关 键 词：实物期权 期权博弈 双头垄断 房地产投资 

分 类 号：O211.63[理学—概率论与数理统计] O225[理学—数学]