基于合作博弈模型的武器装备承制商信用成本与收益研究  

Cooperation Model in Researching Credit Cost and Proceeds of Weapon Equipment Supplier

作　　者：张蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]空军工程大学装备管理与安全工程学院,陕西西安710038

出　　处：《管理科学与研究（中英文版）》2013年第1期1-6,共6页Management Science and Research

摘　　要：良好信用是航空武器装备承制商获得跟军方合作机会的基础，权衡信用成本与所得收益是承制商与军方合作并守信的重要条件。分析了航空武器装备承制商信用成本与收益关系以及承制商守信与失信条件，将博弈论运用到承制商与军方合作条件的研究中，通过建立航空武器装备承制商与军方合作博弈模型，证明了在航空武器装备采办过程中考虑信用成本的双方合作条件能够制约承制商失信行为，为双方带来更多的收益。If good credit is the fundamental for suppliers of aviation weapon equipment having the opportunity to cooperate with military; it is one of the most aspects to weight the relationship between credit cost and proceeds for the cooperation. The article analyzes the relationship between credit cost and proceeds of aviation weapon equipment supplier, as well as the trustworthy and loses trust by suppliers. Game theory is applied to research the cooperation between supplier and military. Through the modeling on the cooperative game between suppliers of aviation weapon equipment and military, to reveal the fact that taking into account the credit cost and cooperation realities can decline the odds of dishonesty by the suppliers such that the both cooperative sides receive much more benefit.

关 键 词：航空武器装备承制商 信用成本 博弈 信用评价 

分 类 号：F724.746[经济管理—产业经济]