财政分权、政府激励与环境治理  

Fiscal Decentralization,Governmental Incentives and Environmental Pollution Abatement

作　　者：刘琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济经纬》2013年第2期127-132,共6页Economic Survey

摘　　要：本文运用中国省级面板数据构建计量模型,分析了在财政分权的体制下,地方政府激励模式对环境污染和治理的影响。实证结果表明,在以GDP为考核指标的激励下,财政分权显著地提高了各种工业污染的排放量,降低了工业污染治理投资额;同时,工业化和城镇化进程加剧了环境污染程度和治理难度。环境问题的改善需要相关部门对地方政府考核机制做出适当调整,地方政府应在其中发挥更为积极的作用。This paper studies local governmental incentives affect under fiscal decentralization on pollution Abatement by econometric mode with the provincial panel data.It is found that with the incentives of GDP,fiscal decentralization increases the industrial pollution emissions and reduces fiscal expenditure of the environmental pollution abatement remarkably,economic and fiscal revenue growth can not change the situation;Moreover,the deterioration in environmental pollution increase the difficulty of environmental pollution abatement with the process of industrialization and Urbanization.FDI does not necessarily result in environmental deterioration.Environmental improvement relies on the appropriate adjustments of the local governments’ assessment mechanism.

关 键 词：财政分权 政府激励 环境治理 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]