基于信号博弈的物流金融风险主体行为分析  

Analysis of the Logistics Financial Main Body Risk Behavior Based on the Signal Game Theory

作　　者：郭春香[1] 石瑞丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院,成都610064

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第3期37-39,43,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71071102;70771093);四川省软科学科技计划项目(2010ZR0002)

摘　　要：利用信号博弈的相关模型及理论对物流企业、银行和融资企业三方的行为进行了分析,结果显示:融资企业为了实现效益最大化,往往会倾向于向市场发送对自己有利的信息或利用较高的报酬和利润率来吸引物流企业和银行的参与。而两者在高利益的诱惑下,往往会愿意冒更大的风险,同意融资企业的提议。This paper analyzes the behavior of the three parties by the signal game theory. The result shows that： financing enterprise in order to realize the benefit maximization, often tend to send own - advantage information to the market or using higher pay to attract the participation of logistics enterprise and the bank. And under the temptation of high benefit, they are often wiUing to take more risk to participate the enterprise financing.

关 键 词：物流金融 信号博弈 金融风险 物流企业 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]