企业政治关联、银行贷款及投资效率——基于银根紧缩的实证研究  

Political Connections,Loan Contract,and Its Investment Efficiency:An Empirical Study under the Background of Monetary Restraint

作　　者：潘克勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2013年第2期8-14,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072084;709721397);教育部人文社科项目(09YJAZH027)

摘　　要：结合央行金融政策变化特征与民营上市公司实际控制人政治身份背景,实证分析了银根紧缩季度企业急需资金的银行贷款满足程度及投资效率。研究发现:在银根紧缩季度,企业急需的资金贷款满足程度严重下降,政治关联企业急需资金的贷款满足程度上升,这种现象在政府干预较弱地区表现更为明显;银根紧缩时期通过政治关联获得的银行贷款,其本季度及下季度的投资效率均得到改善,这种现象在政府干预较弱地区体现得也更明显。可见,在政府干预较弱的情况下,银根紧缩时期民营企业政治关联能促进紧缺贷款资金的合理配置。Considering the political status of actual controllers,empirical analysis on the relationship of loan and the investment efficiency has been done under the dynamic of central bank financial policies.It is found that： companies hardly borrow money from banks under the monetary restraint,however,companies which have political connection can get needed money much easier,especially in the districts with week political interactions.And those companies usually increase their quarterly investment efficiency after they get the loans.Therefore,it is concluded that political connection can improve the investment efficiency at the places with week political interactions.

关 键 词：银根紧缩 实际控制人政治身份 季度银行贷款 季度投资效率 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]