产品市场竞争、董事会治理与上市公司信息披露质量  

Product Market Competition,Board Governance on Disclosure Quality

作　　者：黄蕾[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2013年第2期83-87,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：以我国627家上市公司为样本,通过实证研究发现董事会规模、内部董事比例、两职分离状况的系数有利于提高企业的信息披露质量;独立董事比例以及董事会会议召开次数对信息披露质量的提高没有影响。在高竞争度的样本内,企业的内部董事比例、董事会会议召开次数与信息披露质量存在一定的显著性,董事会规模、独立董事比例、两职分离状况的系数与信息披露质量均表现出关系不显著的特征,这说明产品市场竞争与董事会治理机制之间为替代关系;而在低产品市场竞争度样本回归中,董事会治理五个特征变量与市场披露的相关系数与全样本基本一致。Empirical research has been done by the data of 627 listed companies.The results show that scale of board,the ratio of internal directors and the separating the CEO and chairman roles have effects on the disclosure quality,however,the ratio of independent directors and meeting frequency have no effect on the disclosure quality.In the market with high competition,internal directors and board meeting frequency have significant effects on disclosure quality,however,the scale of board,independent directors and separating the CEO and chairman have no effect on disclosure quality.Therefore,product market competition to same extent is a substitute of board governance structure.In the market with low competition,things are as same as full samples.

关 键 词：产品市场竞争 董事会治理 信息披露质量 

分 类 号：F235[经济管理—会计学]