基于演化博弈的企业商业信用行为  

On the Enterprise Commercial Credit Behavior from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：王喜[1] 罗正英[2] 

机构地区：[1]嘉兴学院商学院,浙江嘉兴314001 [2]苏州大学商学院,江苏苏州215001

出　　处：《嘉兴学院学报》2013年第2期114-117,共4页Journal of Jiaxing University

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y6110382)

摘　　要：在分析不同策略成本和收益的基础上,运用演化博弈理论研究了供应商和零售商在商业信用交易中的博弈过程。博弈分析结果表明:违约后法律处罚强度大时,企业采取守信策略;违约后法律处罚强度小时,企业采取失信策略。增加企业守信时的声誉收益和失信时声誉损失,将促使企业采取守信行为。This thesis, based on the analysis of the cost--benefit with different strategies, analyzes the gaming process during suppliers＇ and retailers＇ commercial credit transction. The analysis result reveals that enterprise takes the keep--faith--strategy if a substantial loss from legal punishment could occur, otherwise, the enterprise tends to take the break--faith--strategy. Thus to increase goodwill benefit in case of keeping faith and aggravate goodwill loss due to dishonesty will urge the enterprise to take faithful actions.

关 键 词：企业 商业信用 成本收益 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F830.56[经济管理—金融学]