“既强调可错论又反怀疑主义”——论普特南实在论中的实用主义因素  

“Being both Fallibilistic and Antisceptical”: Pragmatic Components in Putnam’s Realism

作　　者：葛欢欢[1] 

机构地区：[1]深圳大学文学院哲学系,深圳518060

出　　处：《常熟理工学院学报》2013年第1期36-42,共7页Journal of Changshu Institute of Technology

摘　　要：普特南强调在后期维特根斯坦甚至康德的思想中发现了与实用主义相似的因素:既强调可错论又反对怀疑主义。它们从不同的方面影响了普特南对实在论的构想。其中康德的影响集中于内在实在论中世界依赖于心灵对它的表征的观点,后期维特根斯坦的影响在于普特南长久以来对功能和用法的重视,而经典实用主义直接启发普特南用多元主义与一种朴素的直观对抗形而上学实在论与反实在论。Putnam finds a similar component between views of the later Wittgenstein, Kant and pragmatism： ＂being both fallibilistic and antisceptical＂. Their influence on Putnam＇s realism is different. Kant＇s empirical realism shows that the world depends on the representation of mind. Views of the later Wittgenstein make Putnam empha- size function and use. Classical pragmatism makes him fight against metaphysical realism and anti-realism with pluralism and the conception of naive intuition.

关 键 词：康德的经验实在论 维特根斯坦 内在实在论 可错论 詹姆斯的直接实在论 

分 类 号：B087[哲学宗教—哲学理论]