有限回合条件下企业并购定价的博弈  

The Game of M&A Pricing under Limited Rounds

作　　者：周媛媛[1] 李帮义[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京210016

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2013年第2期151-161,176,共12页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目(10BGL010);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJA630064)

摘　　要：基于有限理性和信息不对称的框架,通过引入博弈学习理论,建立了一个存在破裂风险的有限回合条件下企业并购定价谈判模型,并且从并购方角度,讨论了影响其最优行动使用效果的主要因素及应对措施。结论表明,并购方最优行动的使用效果与其对谈判中确定性期望收益观察到的可能性以及被并购方对谈判破裂风险的判断紧密相关。因此,并购方可以在谈判中根据自身对期望收益观察到的程度,通过操纵被并购方对谈判破裂风险变化趋势的认知,而对被并购方不断施加压力,使其做出让步,从而使自身期望收益最大化。Based on a framework with bounded rationality and asymmetric information, we incorporate the theory of learning into games and build an M^A pricing model featured by risk of breakdown and limited round. We analyze from the point-view of the acquirer and discuss the main factors that affect the optional decisions and the corresponding measures. The result shows that the use of the optimal operational actions of the acquirer is closely related to the possibility of being observed of its optimal operational effectiveness and the attitude of the target enterprise to the assessment of the risks. The acquirer may exercise pressure on the target enterprise and attempt to force it to make concession through the manipulation of the target enterprisers cognitive which relates to the trend of the risk of breakdown of negotiations and maximize the merger＇s expected return.

关 键 词：有限回合 有限理性 信息不对称 观察可能性 破裂风险 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]