收费公路项目Pareto有效BOT合同与政府补贴  

Pareto-efficient BOT contracts for road franchising with government subsidy

作　　者：谭志加[1] 杨海[2] 陈琼[3] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074 [2]香港科技大学土木与环境工程系 [3]国防信息学院,武汉430010

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2013年第3期10-20,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71201067);教育部博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20110142120086)

摘　　要：根据BOT(建设-运营-移交)项目中公共部门和私人部门的不同目标,利用双目标规划模型研究了收费公路BOT项目合同容量、通行费费率及政府补贴政策的联合决策.引入Pa-reto有效BOT合同的概念,并从理论上研究了Pareto有效BOT合同的性质,建立了两个必要条件用以甄别BOT合同的Pareto有效性.进一步完善目前收费公路BOT项目合同的理论研究,对公共部门制定收费公路项目补贴政策具有现实指导意义.Private-sector participation in road construction and operations has the advantages of efficiency gains, private financing, and better identification of attractive investment projects. Such participation is generally implemented through a build-operate-transfer （BOT） contract, under which a private firm builds and operates roads in a road network at its own expense, and in return receives the revenue from road tolls for a number of years, and then these roads are transferred to the government. In a BOT toll road project, the public and private sectors have different objectives： the former cares about the social welfare and the latter wants to make more money from the project. Based on the different objectives of the two sectors, this paper analyzes the Pareto efficiency of the capacity, toll and subsidy size by adopting a bi-objective mathematical programming problem. The definition of the Pareto-efficient BOT contract is introduced for the hi-objective programming problem, and its properties are also studied theoretically. This paper conducts a further study for the current research of BOT toll road schemes, which provides a practical guidance for the public sector.

关 键 词：收费公路特许经营 政府补贴 BOT(建设-运营-移交) Pareto有效合同 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F505