允许不完全拍卖的多轮逆向组合拍卖机制  

Multi-round reverse combinatorial auction mechanism allowing incomplete auction

作　　者：祁宁[1] 汪定伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学信息科学与工程学院流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室,沈阳110819

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2013年第3期61-67,共7页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70931001);国家自然科学基金创新群体资助项目(60821063);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771021;61273203);国家教育部博士点基金资助项目(200801450008)

摘　　要：物品之间的互补性和替代性使得逆向组合拍卖成为较为有效的采购方式.设计了一种允许不完全拍卖的多轮逆向组合拍卖机制,并设计了基于预处理规则的改进最大-最小蚁群算法(MMAS)——PRIM(preprocessing rules-based improved MMAS),求解每轮的胜标确定问题.结果表明,允许不完全拍卖的多轮拍卖机制能够显著地降低采购成本.In procurement, if there are complementarities or substitutabilities between the goods, a combinatorial reverse auction can be beneficial. In this paper, we present a multi-round bidding mechanism, in which incomplete bidding is allowed, and show that much more procurement cost can be saved evidently by using this mechanism. A common model is formulated and a PRIM （preprocessing rules-based improved MMAS） algorithm is adopted in solving the winner determination problem of reverse combinatorial auction in every round.

关 键 词：逆向组合拍卖 多轮拍卖机制 获胜者确定问题 最大-最小蚁群算法 预处理规则 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]