存在强势零售商与直销渠道的供应链内生时机  

Endogenous timing of supply chain with dominant retailer and direct channel

作　　者：刘军[1] 谭德庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2013年第4期1028-1031,1043,共5页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271175);国家教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(12YJC630096);四川省科技支撑计划资助项目(2011SZ0228)

摘　　要：在由强弱零售商和直销渠道组成的非对称供应链中,探讨定价权转移、消费者忠诚度以及保留价格差异对三种博弈时机下均衡结果的影响,然后研究供应链内生时机,对消费者剩余和社会福利进行分析,最后通过数值仿真验证所得结论。研究表明:在三种博弈时机下,定价权转移使得强势零售商比竞争对手获得更多利润;供应链博弈内生时机为制造商领导和零售商领导;随着产品保留价格差异的增加,消费者剩余降低,但社会福利先降低后升高。In an asymmetrical supply chain with dominant/weak retailer and direct channel,the article firstly discussed the effect of transfer of pricing power,consumer loyalty and reservation price difference on equilibrium results under three game timing.Then,it studied endogenous timing of supply chain,and analyzed consumer surplus and social welfare.Finally,it verified the conclusions through numerical simulation.The study shows that transfer of pricing power enables dominant retailer get more profits than its competitor.Game endogenous timing of supply chain is manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg.When reservation price difference increases,consumer surplus will increase.However,social welfare firstly decreases and then increases.

关 键 词：供应链 分销渠道 强势零售商 直销渠道 内生时机 福利分析 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]