资源错配与政治周期  

Resource Misallocation and Political Cycles

作　　者：周黎安[1] 赵鹰妍[1] 李力雄[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《金融研究》2013年第3期15-29,共15页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目的资助(项目批准号70973004);数量经济与数理金融教育部重点实验室(北京大学)的支持

摘　　要：本文利用1998～2007年中国工业企业数据和地级层面的官员数据,旨在从实证角度研究中国制造业的资源错配程度与地方党代会周期之间的内在关系。利用Hsieh andKlenow(2009)关于制造业资源错配程度的测度,我们发现,在省级党代会召开的当年和后两年,地级行政区的资源错配程度显著较高,在接下来的两年有所降低。我们的分析还显示,资源错配的党代会周期效应分别在国有企业密集度、产业关联效应度高或资本密集度高的行业表现更为明显。这些经验证据说明地方官员的晋升激励虽然有助于促进地区GDP增长,但与此同时也可能对地区的资源配置效率产生负面影响。Using a large dataset of manufacturing firms and local officials during 1998 - 2007, this paper investigates the empirical relationship between resource misallocation in the manufacturing sector and the timing of local Party Congress in China. Exploiting the measure of industrial - level resource misallocation proposed by Hsieh and Klenow （2009）, we find that the manufacturing misallocation significantly increases in the Party Congress year and the subsequent two years, and decreases in the other two years. This relationship between misallocation and political cycles becomes more pronounced for industries with higher concentration of state - owned enterprises, capital - intensive firms or industries with strong linkage effects. This evidence suggests that while the promotion incentive of local officials in China may induce high GDP growth, it also generates negative impacts on allocative efficiency.

关 键 词：资源错配 政治周期 官员激励 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济] F224