基于大股东控制的上市公司股利政策分析——以佛山照明“高派现”为例  

Discussion on Dividend Policy of Listed Company under Large Shareholders' Control——Case Study on FSL's High Cash Dividend Phenomenon

作　　者：龚珏[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学工商管理学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《科技广场》2013年第1期239-244,共6页Science Mosaic

摘　　要：上市公司代理问题成为制约我国证券市场以及上市公司发展的一个重要问题,而其中比较突出的是大股东利用其控制权对中小股东的利益进行侵占。这其中,股利政策又往往成为大股东用来追求自身利益,侵害中小股东利益的一种手段。本文以代理理论为基础,以佛山照明股份公司的现金股利政策为个案进行分析,深入发掘上市公司大股东制定股利政策的动因,为大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题提供有力的证据,有助于投资者理性地看待上市公司的股利分配行为,为相关政策的制定提供合理的思路。The agency problems of listed company become an important problem which restricts our country securities market and listed companies＇ development,one of the prominent problems is that the large shareholders occupy the interests of minority shareholders by controlling interest and dividend policy becomes a method which large shareholders use to pursue their own interests,infringe upon the interests of minority shareholders.This paper shared of FSL＇s cash dividend policy as a case analysis based on agency theory,explore the reasons of dividend policy in the listed company controlled by large shareholders,provide powerful evidence for the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders,help investors rationally and rightly view on the dividend distribution behavior of listed companies,and have a reasonable evaluation of capital market,at the same time provide the reasonable ideas for related policy formulation.

关 键 词：大股东控制 股利政策 现金股利 “高派现”现象 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]