一个无证书签名方案的三种攻击方法  

Three Types of Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme

作　　者：吴晨煌[1] 李慧敏[1] 黄慧[2] 陈智雄[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]莆田学院数学与应用数学系,莆田市351100 [2]漳州师范学院计算机科学与工程系,福建省漳州市363000

出　　处：《曲阜师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第2期66-70,共5页Journal of Qufu Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61170246);福建省高校服务海西建设重点资助项目(2008HX03);福建省教育厅资助项目(JA12291;JB12179;JB07152)

摘　　要：通过对黄明军(2011)等人提出的无证书签名方案进行安全性分析,发现该签名方案至少能够受到三种攻击,攻击者能够做到对任意选择的消息成功伪造签名.分析了出现这些攻击的根本原因,并给出了一个改进方案.改进后的签名方案不仅克服了上述三种攻击方法,而且在随机预言机模型下证明了安全性是基于CDH和Inv-CDH困难性问题.最后,通过比较发现改进后的签名方案不仅签名长度更短、效率更高,而且信任级别达到了最高级(第3级)等优点.The certificateless signature scheme, proposed by Huang Mingjun （2011） etc., is analyzed and shown that the scheme can at least suffer from three types of attack so that an attacker can forge a valid signature on any message. The fundamental reason of these attacks is provided and also an improved scheme is proposed without the above three types of attack. Under the random oracle model, the improved scheme is proved to be based on the CDH and Inv-CDH assumptions. Finally, compared with some certificateless schemes, the improved scheme is shorter in the length of the signature and more efficient in efficiency. Moreover, the trust level of the scheme can a- chieve the superlative degree, trust level 3.

关 键 词：无证书 数字签名 公钥替换攻击 安全性分析 改进 

分 类 号：TP309.7[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]