博弈视角下被拆迁人的行为选择  

Behavior choice of people whose house will be dismantled from the point of view of game theory

作　　者：施建刚[1,2,3,4] 朱杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院 [2]同济大学房屋土地资源信息研究中心 [3]同济大学房地产研究所 [4]同济大学经纬不动产研究院

出　　处：《城市问题》2013年第4期72-77,共6页Urban Problems

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(12YJA630099)

摘　　要：首先依据博弈理论,构建政府与被拆迁人的混合策略博弈模型,并对此进行理论与实证分析。研究结果显示,政府拆迁实施的行政成本间接影响着被拆迁人的行为选择;合理的拆迁补偿款更易促成被拆迁人选择"妥协"行为;政府公信力缺失会恶化拆迁矛盾,甚至导致群体性冲突。最后提出了相关建议。This essay constructs the mixed strategy game model of government and people whose house will be dismantled according to the game theory, and then conducts theoretical and empirical analysis. The research indicates that the administrative cost of removal affects the behavioral option of the dismantled indirectly and reasonable compensation leads to the compromise of the dismantled. Besides, the deficiency of public credibility will even result in the serious demolition contradiction. Finally, it gives relative suggestions.

关 键 词：博弈 拆迁 旧城改造 

分 类 号：F299.23[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32