银行竞争、代理成本与借款期限结构——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Bank Competition,Agency Cost and Loan Maturity:The Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：马君潞[1] 郭牧炫[1] 李泽广[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《金融研究》2013年第4期71-84,共14页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目(NKZXB10046)资助

摘　　要：本文研究了银行竞争对大型企业借款期限结构的影响,通过构建委托代理模型,细分了银行竞争对企业借款期限结构存在的双重效应——"客户争夺效应"和"代理成本效应"。前者激励银行对优质客户展开争夺,将延长贷款期限作为竞争手段之一;后者则增加了银行的代理成本,缩短了企业的借款期限。采用1998～2007年上市公司的经验数据证实,银行竞争对借款期限的影响主要由"代理成本效应"的强弱决定,该效应越强的地区,上市公司获得的借款期限越短;不同地区银行竞争的"代理成本效应"和"客户争夺效应"相对强弱不尽相同,法律制度越好、政府干预企业越少的地区,"代理成本效应"较弱。In this paper, we analyze the effects of bank competition on loan maturity structure by using a princi- pal - agent model and decomposing double effects of bank competition on loan maturity structure of large enter- prises as ＇ competing for customer effect＇ and ＇ agency cost effect＇. The former one stimulates banks to compete for quality customers by extending the maturity of borrowing as competition strategy; the latter one increase the agency cost making banks shorten the maturity of borrowing of firms. Based on the data of listed companies from 1998 to 2007, we find that the effects of bank competition on loan term structure is mainly dominated by the ＇ a- gency cost effect＇ , more significant agency cost with shorter maturity of borrowings of listed companies. The rel- ative intensity of ＂agency cost effect＂ and ＇ competing for customer effect＇ varies for different reg/ons. That means the ＇ agency cost effect＇ is comparatively weak in the regions with better legal institutions and less gov- ernment intervention.

关 键 词：银行竞争 借款期限结构 客户争夺效应 代理成本效应 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学] F832.4F224