产权性质、信息质量与公司债定价--来自中国资本市场的经验证据  

Ownership Type,Information Quality,and Corporate Bond Pricing;the Empirical Evidence from Capital Market in China

作　　者：方红星[1] 施继坤[2] 张广宝[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北石油大学经济管理学院,黑龙江大庆163318

出　　处：《金融研究》2013年第4期170-182,共13页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70872018;71172120);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(批准号:2009JJD790005);霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金项目(批准号:111087)的资助

摘　　要：本文利用2007～2011年间沪、深两市公开发行的公司债数据,分析产权性质和信息质量对公司债券初始定价的影响。研究发现:国有产权能够发挥隐性担保作用,通过直接和间接作用路径降低投资者面临的违约风险,从而使公司债券获得较低的信用利差;上市公司自愿披露正面内部控制鉴证报告能够向外界释放高信息质量的积极信号,降低投资者面临的信息风险,从而使公司债券获得较低的信用利差,但这种作用在国有上市公司中却不显著,说明政府的隐性担保可能会使投资者忽视对上市公司信息质量的必要关注,存在诱发道德风险的可能。这些发现有利于深入剖析我国公司债定价存在的深层次问题,从而推动公司债券市场的改革与发展。Utilizing data of corporate bonds issued publicly by the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this paper studies the effect of ownership type and information quality on initial pricing of cor- porate bonds in China. It is found that state -owned ownership burdens implicit guarantee, which could lower the credit spread of corporate bonds significantly by direct and indirect paths to default risk. While listed com- panies voluntarily disclose the positive internal control assurance reports can play a signal function to the public about higher information quality. Investors will give a higher price of corporate bonds issued by these listed companies, because of fl, e lower information risk, but this is not significant in the sample of state - owned listed companies, which maybe mean that governments＇ implicit guarantee make investors ignore the necessary atten- tion to information quality of listed companies, inducing moral hazard. These findings are useful for deepening the analysis on 13rofound issues in comorate bond market nricin~, and will nromote its reform nnd d^w, lnnm^nt

关 键 词：公司债券 产权性质 信息质量 内部控制鉴证 信用利差 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]