基于Nash协商模型的批发价格契约  

Wholesale Price Contract Based on Nash Negotiation Model

作　　者：刘层层[1] 楚永杰[1] 卜宪敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]曲阜师范大学管理学院,山东日照276826

出　　处：《洛阳理工学院学报（社会科学版）》2013年第2期26-29,共4页Journal of Luoyang Institute of Science and Technology：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(编号:11071142);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(编号:ZR2010AM034)

摘　　要：在综合考虑缺货惩罚成本以及剩余产品残值的基础上,首先分析了简单批发价格契约的不合理性,即其在协调供应链时所确定的批发价格小于产品的生产成本,然后建立了基于Stackelberg模型的批发价格契约和基于Nash协商模型的批发价格契约。通过分析发现,基于Stackelberg模型的批发价格契约可以克服简单批发价格契约的不合理性,但不能协调供应链,而基于Nash协商模型的批发价格契约不仅克服了简单批发价格契约的不合理性,而且可以实现供应链的协调。最后,通过数值试验验证了相应的结论。Based on the comprehensive consideration of penalty cost of surplus-stock and the salvage of overstock, this paper analyzes firstly the irrationality of the simple wholesale price contract, i. e. the wholesale price determined by the simple wholesale price contract is less than the product cost; and then establishes the wholesale price contract based on the Stackelberg model and the Nash negotiation model. The results, through the survey and analysis, show that the wholesale price contract based on the Stackelberg model can＇ t coordinate the supply chain, despite it can overcome the irrationality of the simple wholesale price contract, while the wholesale price contract based on the Nash negotiation model can not only overcome the irrationality of the simple wholesale price contract, but also coordinate the supply chain. Finally, the numerical experiment followed verifies the conclusions of the paper.

关 键 词：批发价契约 STACKELBERG模型 NASH协商模型 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]