信贷约束与农户非正规金融选择  

CREDIT CONSTRAINT AND THE CHOICE OF INFORMAL FINANCE

作　　者：赵建梅[1] 刘玲玲[2] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学中国公共财政与改革研究院,北京100081 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2013年第4期33-42,共10页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金项目(10YJC790393)

摘　　要：本文考察来自正规金融机构的信贷约束对农户选择非正规金融的影响。基于农户调研,本文首先辨别农户受到的各种信贷约束,并将其与农户融资成本相结合,构建农户融资的理论模型。实证研究采用双变量Probit模型比较各种信贷约束对选择非正规金融的影响。研究发现:供给型和需求型信贷约束都显著地促进农户选择非正规金融。需求型信贷约束中,风险约束较大程度地促进农户通过非正规金融渠道融资。研究结论对制定农村金融政策将提供重要参考。This paper studied the impacts of credit constraints on the selection of informal finance in rural China. Motivated by a theoretical framework, this paper established the direct method of elicitation to China rural survey data. The bivariate probit estimation revealed that both supply-side and demand-side credit rationing significantly constrained rural households＇ capital demands. Importantly, demand-side credit rationing imposed greater marginal effects on the adoption of informal finance than that of supply-side constraints. Above conclusions could provide important guidance in rural policy design.

关 键 词：信贷约束 非正规金融 样本自选择 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]