基于模糊双合作博弈的收益分配模型  

Model of profit allocation based on fuzzy bicooperative game

作　　者：冯庆华[1,2] 陈菊红[1] 刘通[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]西安财经学院信息学院,西安710100

出　　处：《控制与决策》2013年第5期701-705,共5页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272117);陕西省软科学基金项目(2009K01-94);陕西省高校重点学科基金项目(107-00X902)

摘　　要：产品服务化供应链中,多个提供商向系统集成商提供产品和服务,获得了产品和服务收益.以提供商的双重收益分配为例,将提供商的服务质量作为参与程度,在双合作博弈的基础上,提出了模糊双合作博弈的收益分配模型,定义了Aubin核心和crisp核心,证明了凸模糊双合作博弈中,韦伯集与crisp核心相等且是Aubin核心的子集,并证明了提供商的服务质量提高时,参与的联盟越大,边际收益越大,从而保证最优分配方案的存在性和模糊双联盟结构的稳定性.In the product servitization supply chain, the multiple providers provide products and services to the system integrators and gain the profits of products and services. Taking the double profit allocation of the providers as an example, the profit allocation model of the fuzzy bicooperative game is presented by the service quality of the provider as participation based on the bicooperative game. The Aubin core and the crisp core of the fuzzy bicooperative game are defined. It is proved that the Weber set is consistent with the crisp core and the Weber set is the subset of the Aubin core, and the greater the alliance, the greater the marginal profit with the service quality of the provider increases in the convex fuzzy bicooperative game, which indicate that the optimal allocation is existent and the fuzzy bicoalition is stable.

关 键 词：提供商 模糊双合作博弈 核心 韦伯集 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]