G2G信息交换过程中的行为博弈分析——以城市应急联动系统为实证案例  

A Game Theory Analysis for G2G Information Exchange: Urban Emergency Collaboration IS as Example

作　　者：樊博[1] 呼家财[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学,上海200030

出　　处：《上海行政学院学报》2013年第3期46-54,共9页The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70901052;91024007);上海市曙光计划(09SG16);教育部人文社科基金(09YJC630155)资助

摘　　要：当跨政府部门(G2G)的信息系统进入实际应用阶段,信息共享就表现为信息交换。信息交换的效率实质上决定了协同流程的效率。条块分割和部门利益是阻碍信息交换的核心障碍,G2G信息交换一直是电子政务建设中的难点问题。本文将政府部门的主观行为因素融合到博弈论方法中,构建了外部机构监管下的行为博弈分析模型,分析G2G信息交换中的部门利益博弈行为趋向,提出促进G2G信息交换的对策方法。根据现有G2G信息共享监管理论中的绩效指标,本文通过在应急联动环境下开展实证调研访谈,筛选出了适用于应急联动环境的核心绩效指标,并发现外部监管机制和措施可减少业务流程响应时间(T),降低参与者业务流程协同成本(C),从而使部门克服行为惰性,实现协同效益的帕累托优化改进,维系G2G的信息交换。基于以上研究发现,本文将G2G信息交换的外部监管机制集成到博弈模型中,构建了外部监管下的信息交换行为博弈模型。When G2G information systems step into real application, information sharing becomes information exchange which is the key determinant for the operation of business process. As far as G2G information exchange is concerned, The bureaucratic nature and stove-piped structure of organizations prevent information from exchanging. The paper incorporated behavior element into game theory model, and proposed a third part participation function into the model to analyze behaviors for each agency. Furthermore, based on the business process reengineering theory that established several meatrics. A survey is conducted in an emergency collaboration managent center of a certain urban district. Two measures including response time （T） and cost （C） are perserved as benchmarking indicators that should guide G2G information exchange to an Pareto Optimality. The proposed model is tested by the emergency collaboration informa- tion system, and the result proved the robust of our work.

关 键 词：G2G信息交换 博弈论 应急联动 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]