水电工程施工安全目标考核方案决策研究  

On the assessment program decision for safety objectives in hydropower engineering construction

作　　者：陈述[1] 胡志根[1] 郑霞忠[2] 刘洋 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室,武汉430072 [2]三峡大学水利与环境学院,湖北宜昌443002 [3]南水北调中线建管局河南直管建管局,郑州450046

出　　处：《安全与环境学报》2013年第2期243-248,共6页Journal of Safety and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(51079115;51279137);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(201120602020006)

摘　　要：为给水电工程施工安全目标考核方案决策提供理论支持,通过分析我国水电工程施工安全生产奖惩约束机制,针对奖励、惩罚等激励变量实施的同步性,归纳总结奖励惩罚同步实施、仅实施惩罚、仅实施奖励3种水电工程施工安全目标考核方案。基于"经济人"属性,计算业主和承包商的期望效益函数,分别建立3种情形下的决策模型,利用激励约束、参与约束等约束条件求解Stackelberg博弈均衡,最后对博弈特性进行分析。结果表明,同步实施奖励惩罚的安全目标考核方案是业主的最优方案。最后,通过数值算例验证了该结论。To provide a theoretical support for the assessment program decision of safety objectives, this paper intends to establish a method in scheme decision for the hydropower engineering construction by evaluating the contractor＇s response to the contraction restraints. For this purpose, we would like to propose, first of all, a study of the construction safety in the light of the project control and management, which involve the safety of the hydropower industry and even the whole society. In addition, we have also analyzed the responsibility system for the production safety and the system of awarding and penalty in managing hydraulic engineering projects. Actually, what we can do is to practice three likely to be effective measures, that is, a simultaneous awarding and penalty system, or encouragement or punishment separately. And, correspondingly, we have established the expected utility functions respectively in the above mentioned three schemes. Both of the schemes focus on the attributes of economic pursue both of the contractors, that is, the managerial side of the project and the construction side. To realize the holistic benefit of the group and promote the cooperation between the two sides, it is necessary to establish a bilateral cooperative simulated program model to represent the safety objective assessment. The practice tends to prove that both the contractor and the constructor should try their best to seek for the maximum profit. Therefore, the two sides prefer to restrict themselves in favor of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. And in so doing, it would be possible to solve the Stackelberg game model via balancing the incentive control condition and the participation constraint condition. And, finally, we have also analyzed the game features so as to provide the academic abidance of program decision, which implies that it would be optimistic to practice the awarding and penalty system simultaneously. Thus, it can be seen that the proposed method proves to be valid and credible thro

关 键 词：水利工程施工 安全目标考核 考核方案 博弈 

分 类 号：TV513[水利工程—水利水电工程] X915.4[环境科学与工程—安全科学]