数量折扣契约下制造商与零售商库存合作联盟的稳定性  

Stability of the Inventory Coalitions of Manufacturer and Retailers Under Quantity Discount Contract

作　　者：肖旦[1] 周永务[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2013年第2期20-26,43,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971041;71131003);广东省自然科学基金(10151064101000003)

摘　　要：针对实际中存在的不同形式合作联盟,研究了零售商库存合作联盟,以及制造商与零售商库存合作联盟所形成混合合作联盟的稳定性。在随机需求情况下,制造商通过自身中心仓库向多个零售商提供数量折扣契约,首先证明了两个合作联盟的最优运作决策都存在且唯一,并给出了制造商向零售商库存合作联盟提供数量折扣契约的形式,然后分析了两种合作联盟的稳定性,并得出混合合作联盟的总期望利润要高于零售商库存合作联盟的结论。In practice,there are different forms of alliance and cooperation.This paper focuses on the stability of the coalition of retailers＇ inventory and the mixture between manufacturer＇ inventory and retailers＇ inventory.In this paper,under the random demand,the manufacturer offers multiple downstream retailers the quantity discount through its own central warehouse.At first,it demonstrates that the optimal operation of the two coalitions exists and is the only one possibility,and offers the available form of quantity discounts of the manufacturer and the retail inventory,and then proves the stability of the two coalitions.In the end,the paper draws the conclusion that the expected profit of mixture alliance is better than the expected profit of retailer inventory coalition.

关 键 词：运筹学 供应链 合作博弈 库存合作联盟 稳定性 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]