公路客运监管的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision of Highway Passenger Transport

作　　者：余孝军[1,2] 方春华[3] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学数学与统计学院,贵州贵阳550004 [2]贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室,贵州贵阳550004 [3]湖南理工学院数学学院,湖南岳阳414006

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2013年第2期243-248,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71161005);贵州省优秀科技教育人才省长专项资金项目(2011067)

摘　　要：运用进化博弈理论研究公路客运监管问题,建立了公路客运监管问题的博弈模型,分析了公路客运车主和公路客运管理者之间的行为选择,得到了博弈方的复制动态方程,研究了博弈模型的进化稳定策略。探讨了影响进化稳定策略的因素。研究结果表明公路客运车主和公路客运管理者在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议。A highway passenger transport supervision game model is formulated by using the evolutionary game theory. The behaviors choice between the bus owner of highway passenger transport and the highway passenger transport man- agement department is analyzed. The duplicative dynamic equation of each player in this game is obtained and the ev- olutionary stable strategy of this game model is investigated. The relation between the evolutionary stable strategy and the parameters is analyized. It is showed that the evolutionary stable strategy of the bus owner of highway passenger transport and the highway payoff of each player and passenger transport management department based on bounded rationality depend on the the initial state of the system. Finally, some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model are proposed.

关 键 词：进化博弈论 进化稳定策略 复制动态方程 监管 公路客运 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]