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作 者:王一[1] 龚媛[2] 王程[2] 梅生伟[2] 陈亮[1,3]
机构地区:[1]广东省电力调度中心,广州510600 [2]电力系统及发电设备控制和仿真国家重点实验室(清华大学电机系),北京100084 [3]华南理工大学电力学院,广州510640
出 处:《电力系统及其自动化学报》2013年第2期136-142,共7页Proceedings of the CSU-EPSA
基 金:节能发电调度环境下的广东电网经济调度相关理论研究(K-GD2011-510)
摘 要:随着节能发电调度模式在我国的推行,经济性与节能性成为电网在制定中长期发电计划时需要同时考虑的重要因素。这两个目标相互联系但又并非完全一致。该文在考虑公平性原则的基础上,给出了以电网中长期购电经济性最优及煤耗最优为目标的优化模型。针对这一双目标规划问题,引入博弈论的思想,将各优化目标视为博弈者,从而将不同目标之间的协调过程建模为一个讨价还价的博弈过程。在Nash公理的基础上,通过求解讨价还价型博弈问题,使经济性和节能性目标在竞争、合作意义上实现最优。算例研究表明,该方法具有理论意义与实用性,对中长期购电决策的制定有着重要的参考价值。With pushing through energy-saving power generation dispatching in China's power grids,economic and energy-saving targets have become the most important two issues of the decision-making in medium and long-term power generation scheduling.Generally,these two goals are interrelated mutually but sometimes depart from each other.Based on the consideration of fairness,this paper proposes an optimization model aiming at optimizing the power purchase cost and the coal consumption coordinately for the medium and long-term electricity purchase plan. By introducing game theory into the dual-objective programming problem, each objective can be artificially regard- ed as a player in the game.Thus coordinating the two different targets can be formulated as the process of a bargain- ing game. Both the economic and energy-saving goals can achieve optimum in the sense of competition and cooper- ation, which provides that the Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game is acquired based on Nash axiom. Illustra- tive examples show that the method is promising in the sense of both theory and practice for the decision-making in the medium and long-term electricity purchase plan.
关 键 词:中长期购电计划 节能调度 经济调度 平均负荷率 讨价还价博弈
分 类 号:TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]
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