RFID安全协议的数据去同步化攻击  

Data desynchronization attacks on RFID security protocols

作　　者：曹峥[1] 马建峰[1] 杨林 邓淼磊[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学计算机学院,陕西西安710071 [2]解放军总参第61研究所,北京100039 [3]河南工业大学信息科学与工程学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第4期65-69,共5页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60803150)

摘　　要：为了分析无线射频识别(RFID)安全协议的数据去同步化攻击问题,对串空间模型进行了扩展,引入了分析RFID安全协议数据去同步化攻击的能力,并给出了数据去同步化攻击的判定定理.在扩展的串空间模型下,对近年来提出的一个基于哈希函数的RFID安全协议和一个无需后端数据库的RFID认证协议进行了分析,发现了针对这2个RFID安全协议的数据去同步化攻击,该攻击破坏了协议的可用性.分别对这2个RFID安全协议进行改进,改进后的RFID安全协议克服了存在的安全隐患,能够抵御数据去同步化攻击.The primary objective of this paper is analyze data desynchronization attacks on security protocols for radio frequency identification （RFID）. Thus, the strand space model was extended so that it can be applied to analyze data desynchronization attacks. The theorem of data desynchroniza- tion attacks was also given. Based on the extended strand space model, a recently proposed RFID se- curity protocol based on a hash and an RFID authentication protocol without the need for a bake-end database were analyzed. The results show that these two protocols are vulnerable to the data desyn- chronization attack and the attack destroyed the availability of the protocols. Furthermore, the im- provements to overcome the security vulnerabilities of these protocols are presented.

关 键 词：无线射频识别 安全协议 模型 去同步化攻击 串空间 

分 类 号：TN915.08[电子电信—通信与信息系统]