建筑企业安全监管的博弈分析及政策建议  

Game Analysis and Policy Commendation of the Supervision on the Construction Safety about Construction Enterprises

作　　者：曾雪琴[1] 陈建国[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《建筑经济》2013年第5期93-97,共5页Construction Economy

基　　金：上海市建设交通委<上海建筑市场整治后长效管理机制研究>

摘　　要：鉴于目前我国建筑企业安全生产监管效率低下的状况,采用静态和动态博弈方法构建了政府监管部门与建筑企业的博弈模型,分析实现博弈均衡的条件,并从博弈角度指出我国建筑企业安全监管动力不足的原因,在此基础上对建筑企业安全生产的监管行为提出政策建议。Considering the inefficient construction safety supervising, in this paper, two game models of construction safety supervising has been devised and analyzed by using static and dynamic game theories, and the conditions to achieve a balanced game are obtained. With game models, this paper has also pointed out main reasons of less-mo- tive force when construction enterprises implement the safety control, and some policy suggestions on construction safety supervising are proposed at the end of this article based on these analyses.

关 键 词：政府监管 建筑企业 安全监管 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]