需求受努力因素影响的供应链收益共享契约模型  

Supply Chain Coordination under Revenue-Sharing Contract with Sales Effort Dependent Demand

作　　者：庞庆华[1] 蒋晖[2] 侯岳铭[1] 骆杨[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学企业管理学院,江苏常州213022 [2]河海大学物联网工程学院,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2013年第3期371-378,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目(10YJC630188);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2011B04814);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2011SJD630006);河海大学科技创新基金资助项目(09B002-04)

摘　　要：供应链成员的努力行为是影响市场需求的重要因素之一。在随机的市场需求情形下且市场需求受到供应链成员努力行为因素的影响下,研究了收益共享契约协调三级供应链(由制造商、分销商和零售商组成)问题。在集中决策模式下得出了使得供应链协调时的最优产品订购数量和最优努力水平应满足的条件,并分析了努力因素对收益共享契约协调供应链的影响,解释了此时收益共享契约无法协调供应链的原因。为使得供应链恢复到协调状态,通过在三级供应链中的1或2个交易过程引入回馈与惩罚策略,解决了单纯的收益共享契约无法协调供应链的问题,研究发现,前者是后者的一种特殊情况。最后,在假定市场需求与努力因素满足加法关系时对契约模型进行了优化,给出最优契约参数的确定方法。The effort of supply chain members is one of important factors which influence market demand. Considering a supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer who faces a stochastic demand depending on sales efforts, we study how to use revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, the constraint of the optimal order quantity and the optimal effort is determined with the channel coordinating the supply chain. We then analyze the impact of effort on supply chain coordination based on revenue-sharing contract and show why revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain in that case. To deal with the problem, the revenue-sharing contract based on rebate and penalty policy is proposed. Coordination is achieved by implementing revenue-sharing contract based on rebate and penalty policy in one transaction or two transactions of three-level supply chain. In fact, the former is a special case of the latter. By assuming that the relationship between demand and effort satisfies addition form, we also provide an approach to define the optimal contract parameters.

关 键 词：供应链协调 供应链契约 收益共享契约 努力因素 回馈与惩罚策略 

分 类 号：F406.7[经济管理—产业经济]