低碳供应链中政府监管企业减排的演化博弈模型  

Research of Evolutionary Game Between Governments and Enterprises in the Low-Carbon Supply Chain

作　　者：李媛[1] 赵道致[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第3期193-197,共5页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072155)

摘　　要：在低碳供应链环境下,以博弈理论为工具,构造了政府征收碳税监管企业减排的演化博弈模型。模型给出了企业实施低碳化生产的成本与收益,以及政府采取征税措施的成本与收益,通过计算得到不同情况下的演化稳定策略。分析表明,企业成本与政府税收对实施低碳供应链管理产生重要影响。从长远看,政府应逐步加强环境立法,提高碳税以有效激励企业节能减排,并进一步影响上下游企业,最终实现经济、社会及环境"三赢"。In the low-carbon supply chain environment, an evolutionary game model has been constructed between government and enterprises based on the game theotry. The model presents the costs and benefits of them. By calculation we get ESS（ Evolutionary stable strategy） in different circumstances. The analysis shows that the costs of the enterprises and the taxes of the governments play an important role in implementing the low-carbon supply chain management. From long run, the governments should increasingly enhance the environmental regulation and increase the rate of the carbon tax in order to stimulate the enterprises to save energy and reduce carbon emission. By low-carbonization production, the enterprises acquire environmental experience and then further affect upstream and downstream enterprises. In the end, the economical, social and environmental ＂win-win-win strategy will be realized.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 演化博弈 激励机制 碳税 减排 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]