业绩评价、职业声誉和基金经理行为异化  

Performance Evaluation,Reputation Incentive and the Distortion in Fund Managers' Behavior

作　　者：彭文平[1] 杨蓝蓝[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经管学院,广东广州510006 [2]中国人民银行从化市支行,广东广州510909

出　　处：《经济管理》2013年第6期81-94,共14页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自科基金项目"基金行业锦标赛与基金经理激励约束效应研究"(71002087);广东省人文社科基地重点项目"基金家族利益输送与投资者公平待遇研究"(09JDXM79010)

摘　　要：本文以开放式基金经理更换事件为样本,从隐性激励角度分析了业绩评价机制和职业声誉机制的相互作用及其对基金经理行为异化的影响。研究结果表明,我国基金业盛行的短期业绩评价机制扭曲了基金经理声誉激励机制,造成了基金经理的羊群行为和短期行为,特别是对于年轻、资历浅的基金经理更是如此。但长期业绩评价机制下基金经理的行为没有异化。所以,基金业短期业绩评价机制亟待改善,建立长效激励机制势在必行。With the impressive growth of China＇s Securities Investment Fund, small-medium investors have va- rious investment tools nowadays. In contrary to the rapid development of fund, the performance is not so well-pleas- ing. Many factors can contribute to the fund performance, many people think that fund managers＇ ability may be the main reason for poor performance. Though, we think that it has much to do with fund managers＇ behavior instead of ability. Several articles show that managers＇ behavior is one of the critical factors that determine fund performance. To some extent, fund managers＇ herd and short-term behaviors should be responsible for the poor performance of China＇s Securities Investment Fund. Herd and short-term behaviors are two types of distortion in fund managers＇ behavior, and this distortion can a- rise in a variety of contexts, the drawback of incentive mechanism is one of the most important factors that lead to these behaviors. It is known that incentive mechanism can provide managers with incentives and constraints. But the problems of fund managers＇ behavior in China indicate that the current incentive mechanism can not have a posi- tive impact on managers＇ behavior. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to check the drawbacks of incentive mecha- nism, and then examine how they influence fund managers＇ behavior, and if the defect of incentive mechanism re- sult in fund managers＇ herd and short-term behavior. Both explicit and implicit incentives are included in incentive mechanism. Career concerns is a type of implicit incentive. Several theories of reputation suggest that managers＇ career concerns affect their decisions. From the per- spective of career concerns, this paper studies whether the drawback of reputation incentive has led to fund managers＇ herd and short-term behavior. From the perspective of implicit incentive, Using the sample statistics pe- riod from 2005 to 2010, this study uses a sample of open-ended fund managers＇ replacement to analyze performance

关 键 词：业绩评价 职业声誉 基金经理 羊群行为 短期行为 

分 类 号：F830.39[经济管理—金融学]