药品的管制价格与研发投入的均衡——基于新药研发成功不确定性的博弈论模型  

Drug pricing regulation and research investment equilibrium: based on the uncertainty game theory model of new drugs research success

作　　者：曹剑涛[1] 俞晔[1] 马进[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学,上海200052

出　　处：《卫生经济研究》2013年第6期34-37,共4页

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71273175);上海市公共卫生重点学科建设项目(12GWZX0601)

摘　　要：政府对新药的限价过低将会抑制药品的研发投入,价格过高又必然会损害患者的效用。文章通过模型分析,认为在政府有能力对新药进行合理定价的情况下,存在政府定价与药品研发投入的纳什均衡。应用限价策略,不仅能为政府审查药品的价格提供参考、能为政府对新药限价提供依据,而且有助于保证药企研发投入的合理水平。The government limit too low on new drugs price will curb investment in research and development of drugs, and too high price will inevitably damage the effectiveness of the patients. The model analysis that, if the government has the capable to make reasonable price of new drug, then there has the investment Nash equilibrium between government pricing and drug research and development. Application the drug price limit strategy, not only make reference for the government to review the price of drugs, but also provide a reference for the Government to limit new drugs price, and helps to ensure a reasonable level of investment in new drug research and development of pharmaceutical companies.

关 键 词：药品研发投入 政府限价 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：R194[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]