职业经理人入股企业的激励研究  

The incentive research for the professional managers shareholders in enterprises

作　　者：薛超凯[1] 段福兴[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学商学院,山东淄博255012

出　　处：《山东理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第1期50-53,共4页Journal of Shandong University of Technology:Natural Science Edition

摘　　要：企业所有者为使职业经理人更加努力地为企业创造利润,要求部分经理人入股企业.基于职业经理人入股企业的视角,研究企业所有者和职业经理人之间的利益,通过建立双方博弈模型,定量分析企业所有者和职业经理人的效用函数,讨论了对称信息和非对称信息两者情形.为企业所有者激励职业经理人起到一定的借鉴作用.The enterprise owners sometimes require parts of their professional managers admit some shares in business for the sake of that they could make much more added business profits for them. In this article, a research was made in the benefits between enterprise owners and the pro-fessional manager shareholders from the latter＇s viewpoint . The two conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information was discussed through the establishment of two-side business contest and the quantitative analysis of utility function of both sides. This article draws some references for enterprise owners to encourage professional managers.

关 键 词：委托代理 入股模式 合作博弈 激励 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]