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出 处:《Computer Technology and Application》2013年第2期93-104,共12页计算机技术与应用(英文版)
摘 要:Without cooperative behaviors, our society or organization falls into social dilemma situations where every member selects uncooperative (defective) behaviors, and the situation gets worse and worse. Such a situation in a society or an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for us to make efforts and take measures to elicit cooperative behaviors. It was demonstrated theoretically that altruism strategy and adaptive prediction and ascertainment strategy are in some cases better than rational strategy under the situation of social dilemma. We built up a mathematical model in order to examine how the probability of correctly predicting and ascertaining the behavior (cooperation or defection) of opponents and the mixture of (a) altruism (all cooperation) strategy, (b) individualism (all defection) strategy, and (c) adaptive prediction and ascertainment strategy affected the expected profit. Simulation results showed that the tit-for-tat strategy was better than the rational (individualism) strategy when the probability of correctly predicting and ascertaining defection of the opponent was considerably higher. As an application of the basic study above, it was explored, using a simulation method, how such a system as opening reputation or peer review in public could work satisfactorily to prevent defective behaviors in auction dealing. The result showed that the information on the handle name and the reputation effectively worked to prevent defective behaviors.
关 键 词:Prisoner's dilemma COOPERATION DEFECTION ascertainment of defection internet dealing reputation.
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