Condition to Gain More Profits and Promote Cooperation by Tit-for-Tat Strategy in Finite and Repeated Prisoner＇s Dilemma  

作　　者：Atsuo Murata Naoki Hata 

机构地区：[1]Dept. of lntelligent Mechanical Systems, Division of lndustrial Innovation Sciences, Graduate School of Natural Science andTechnology, Okayama University, Okayama 700-8530, Japan

出　　处：《Computer Technology and Application》2013年第1期23-33,共11页计算机技术与应用（英文版）

摘　　要：As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting cooperation when the tit-for-tat strategy is adopted in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma situations. A mathematical model, in which three different strategies （tit-for-tat, all defection （individualism）, and all cooperation （altruism）） exist, was constructed in order to demonstrate the condition that can promote cooperative behaviors. As a result of an agent-agent computer simulation, it was shown that the tit-for-tat strategy promoted more cooperation than other strategies when the number of agents adopting the tit-for-tat strategy was dominant in the population and the discount parameter was larger. Next, it was explored how the tit-for-tat strategy in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma promotes cooperation using a human-agent computer simulation. In other words, the condition under which cooperative behavior is encouraged was clarified. In the simulation experiment, the discount rate was controlled as an experimental variable. As well as the first experiment above, the dominant occupation of the tit-for-tat strategy was found to lead to the promoted cooperation. Concerning the effect of discount parameter on the cooperative behavior, the cooperation rate tended to increase with the increase of discount parameter only when the t-t-for-tat strategy is dominant. As a whole, the type of change of discount parameter did not affect the cooperation rate.

关 键 词：Prisoner＇s dilemma COOPERATION defect tit-for-tat strategy discount parameter violation-based accident. 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]