一种间接声誉机制下的演化博弈特征  

Some characteristics of evolutionary games on a indirect reputation rule

作　　者：董飞[1] 周永辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州师范大学数学与计算机科学学院,贵州贵阳550001

出　　处：《贵州师范学院学报》2013年第3期5-9,共5页Journal of Guizhou Education University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(11161011)资助

摘　　要：在重复博弈中为了某种利益,背叛者往往因会合作而赢得好声誉.首先给出一种间接声誉评价规则,即对个体在前两次博弈行为中都给予他人帮助才赋予好的声誉.然后基于一种声誉方程,讨论了群体的最佳回应区域、纳什平衡及最佳回应动力学演化特征.指出,存在对应的混合策略内部区域,经过长期演化,背叛者最终占据整个种群.In repeated games, defectors will corperate sometimes for a good reputation. In this paper we first pro- pose an evaluating rule of indirect reputation, that is, giving a good reputation to the only one who corperate twice be- fore playing a next game. Then we investigate some characteristics of the evolutionary games, including the origins of best reply mixed strategies to pure strategies, Nash equilibrium points and some best reply dynamics. It shows that there exists corresponding inner range of mixed strategies such that defectors may dominate the whole population.

关 键 词：演化 合作 声誉 最佳回应 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]