延期支付下的易腐品联合采购费用分配  被引量:14

Cost allocation for collaborative procurement on perishable products under permissible delay in payments

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作  者:冯海荣[1,2] 李军[1] 曾银莲[1] 

机构地区:[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031 [2]四川师范大学商学院,成都610101

出  处:《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第6期1411-1423,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基  金:教育部长江学者和创新团队发展计划(IRT0860);国家自然科学基金重大项目(71090402);国家自然科学基金(71271178)

摘  要:在激烈的市场竞争中,信用销售方式作为企业提升竞争力、扩大销售和经营规模的主要手段,受到越来越多的企业以及学者的关注.在供应商允许延期支付货款的条件下,研究了多零售商组成采购联盟向供应商联合采购某种易腐品的订货决策问题.考虑多零售商联合采购的订货费用、采购费用、库存费用、信用期内的利息收入、信用期限外的利息支出,将易腐品联合采购的费用分配问题构造成易腐品联合采购博弈,证明了博弈满足次加性和平衡性,并给出一种属于博弈核心的费用分配方法.研究发现,联盟参与者越多,最优订货周期越短;联合采购时联盟的总费用小于各零售商独立采购时的费用之和,这样零售商就有动机组成采购联盟;联合采购能降低各零售商的总费用.Trade credit is a main source for enterprises to improve competitiveness, promote products sales, and enlarge market share in the fierce market competition. And thus, it has received tremendous attention from enterprises and scholars. This paper studies the collaborative procurement problem for multi-retailers who form a purchasing alliance under the permissible delay of payments offered by the supplier. In this paper, the ordering cost, the purchasing cost, the holding cost, the interest earned and the interest charged are considered; the cost allocation problem for collaborative procurement on perishable products is formulated as a cooperative game. It is proved that the corresponding game is subadditive and balanced. Furthermore, an allocation rule is proposed and proved to be a core allocation. The results show that the optimal replenishment cycle length will be decreasing when the scale of the purchasing alliance is increasing; the alliance's cost is less than the sum of retailers' independent cost, and thus retailers are prone to form a purchasing alliance; collaborative procurement leads to a decrease in each retailer's cost.

关 键 词:联合采购 易腐品 延期支付 合作博弈 费用分配 

分 类 号:F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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