分税制效率的经济学分析——基于分税制与包干制的比较研究  

Economic Analysis of the Tax-sharing System's efficiency: Comparative Study based on Tax-sharing system and Contract system

作　　者：褚敏[1] 靳涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院,000000

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2013年第5期16-26,共11页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目"新中国60年经济发展与制度变迁的互动关系与经验教训研究"(批准号:09BJL002);教育部研究基地重大项目"转轨深化;经济结构调整与可持续发展"(批准号:2009JJD790039)

摘　　要：本文构建了一个简单的中央-地方政府的两阶段博弈模型,基于寻租这个视角,探讨了财政体制演变过程中地方政府行为的变化及其宏观经济后果,较好地解释了中央转移支付低效率的根源。结果发现,分税制较包干制是制度上的改进,它的效率取决于中央政府设定的税收分享比例,即依赖于地方政府财权和事权的合理配置。此外,在分税制下,中央转移支付虽然能够实现地方公共投资的最优水平,但是它却激励了地方政府的寻租活动,抑制了中央和地方的公共品投资,因而是破坏社会福利的。This paper incorporates the local governments＇ rent-seeking activities in a multigovernment setting and investigates the local governments＇ behavior and effect on macroeconomic in the evolution of the financial system, reasonably explained the source of central transfers＇ low efficiency. The tax-sharing system is the institutional improvements comparing with the contract system and its efficiency depends on the proportion of tax sharing set by the central government, That is , depend on the local revenue-expenditure allocation. Moreover, In the tax-sharing system, the central transfers is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities and therefore depresses useful public goods provided by both the central and local governments, even if its game may attain the first-best level of public investment.

关 键 词：分税制 中央转移支付 地方公共投资 寻租 

分 类 号：F810.2[经济管理—财政学]