网络购物中的多重委托代理与诚信激励机制研究  

Research on multiple principal-agent and integrity incentive mechanism in online shopping

作　　者：杨皎平[1] 张恒俊[1] 张野[1] 

机构地区：[1]渤海大学管理学院,辽宁锦州121013

出　　处：《渤海大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第2期183-189,共7页Journal of Bohai University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(No:10YJC630407);国家自然科学基金项目(No:71201012)

摘　　要：采用博弈论的方法分析了网购市场中的委托代理关系,研究得出:当前的网购市场中,由于消费者和网购平台之间是一个控制较弱的委托代理关系,并且两种利益的不一致,导致了网购平台不能按照消费者的意愿去监管在线卖方,如果能通过建立一定的制度,将消费者的利益和网购平台的利益进行绑定整合,网购平台将会付出更多的努力去监管在线卖方使其提供高质量的产品,从事诚信交易.The principal-agent relationship in online shopping market is analyzed using game theory,and the conclusions are that online shopping platform cannot regulate online seller in accordance with the willingness of consumers due to the weaker principal-agent relationship between consumers and online shopping platform and their inconsistent interests.We believe that online shopping platform may pay more efforts to supervise online seller to provide high quality products and transact honestly if binding consumers’ interests with online shopping’s through certain system.

关 键 词：电子商务 购物平台 诚信 多重委托代理 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]