隐性约束、有限理性与非正规金融的扩张边界  

Implicit Constraints, Bounded Rationality and the Border of Informal Finance

作　　者：杨农[1] 匡桦[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国银行间市场交易商协会

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2013年第6期88-96,共9页Studies of International Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金后续项目<非正规金融:根源;运行与演进>(11FJL017)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：正规金融的规范管理会产生"隐性约束"从而增加中小微型企业借贷过程中的交易成本,而由民间信用衍生的非正规金融则能有效降低这一成本,但民间信用的"声誉约束"必须具备一定条件才能发挥作用。于是,在借贷双方有限理性的情况下,非正规金融体系存在扩张边界,越过这一边界将极易爆发风险。基于交易成本构建正规金融、非正规金融以及借款者的均衡模型,刻画正规金融以及非正规金融规模扩张过程中风险导致交易成本变化,将能够解释非正规金融扩张边界和不同监管方式对非正规金融产生的影响。Compared to ＇Implicit Constraints ＇generated by formal finance, informal finance can reduce transaction costs of Small and micro enterprises. However, reputation constraints of informal finance play a role in very harsh conditions. When borrower and lender are finite rationality, informal finance has its own expansion boundary, and easy to outbreak risk. In this article, we have built up a short-medium term equilibrium model, and it is clearly show that expansion bound-ary and different regulatory shock informal finance.

关 键 词：正规金融 非正规金融 隐性约束 有限理性 扩张边界 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]