LBlock码的不可能差分密码性能分析  

Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of LBlock Code

作　　者：郭建胜[1] 罗伟[1] 张磊 郭渊博[1] 

机构地区：[1]解放军信息工程大学 [2]沈阳市65012部队

出　　处：《电子与信息学报》2013年第6期1516-1519,共4页Journal of Electronics & Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(11204379);河南省科技创新杰出青年计划项目(104100510025)资助课题

摘　　要：该文分析研究了LBlock分组密码算法的不可能差分性质。基于LBlock算法的轮函数结构和部分密钥分别猜测技术,给出了21轮和22轮的LBlock算法的不可能差分分析方法。攻击21轮LBlock算法所需的数据量约为262,计算量约为262次21轮加密;攻击22轮LBlock算法所需的数据量约为262.5,计算量约为263.5次22轮加密。与已有的结果相比较,分析所需的计算量均有明显的降低,是目前不可能差分分析攻击LBlock的最好结果。The impossible differential property of LBlock block cipher is analyzed. Based on the property ot the structure of round function and the technology of key-byte guessing, two impossible differential attacks on 21-round and 22-round reduced LBlock are presented. It is shown that the attack on 21-round requires about 262 chosen plaintexts and 262 21-round encryptions, and on 22-round requires about 262.5 chosen plaintexts and 263.5 22-round encryptions. The presented results are the best impossible differential attack on reduced-round LBlock so far.

关 键 词：分组密码 不可能差分分析 LBlock分组密码 计算复杂性 

分 类 号：TN918.1[电子电信—通信与信息系统]