基于策略消费者行为的限量与价格承诺  

Rationing and price commitment in the presence of strategic consumers

作　　者：陈雯[1,2] 徐贤浩[1] 彭红霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]广州大学工商管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第3期307-315,共9页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71131004);国家自然科学基金主任基金资助项目(71040017);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2011TS118);教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(09YJA630043);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(12YJC630149)

摘　　要：考虑策略消费者和短视消费者并存的市场中,等待低价的策略消费者所占比例对厂商决策的影响.在市场需求与消费者对产品估价均为随机变量下,建立了垄断厂商利润最大化的模型,给出了限量策略下厂商最优订货量和消费者最优保留价格的理性预期均衡解.进一步比较限量策略和价格承诺发现,限量可以吸引策略消费者尽早购买,承诺产品价格不变可以完全打消策略消费者等待的念头;当策略消费者所占比例较低时,宜采取限量策略,当策略消费者所占比例较高时,价格承诺更有助于厂商提高利润.This paper analyzes how the strategic consumers＇ fraction influences firms＇ decisions in a market containing both strategic and myopic consumers. A mathematical model is established to maximize the monopoly＇s profit where the market demand and consumers＇ valuation are both random variables. Optimal solutions of the firm＇s ordering quantity and consumers＇ reservation price are given. Comparing the rationing and price commitment policies, it＇s found that rationing can induce strategic consumers to purchase earlier, while price commitment（keeping prices high） can totally deter consumers＇ waiting behavior. When the strategic consumers＇ fraction is relatively low, rationing will be preferred, and price commitments tend to be more valuable when the strategic consumers＇ fraction becomes larger.

关 键 词：策略消费者 短视消费者 限量 价格承诺 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]