声誉机制、小额贷款公司的行为选择与政府监管应对——广州小贷公司抢占金融街现象探析  

作　　者：徐军辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2013年第6期154-159,共6页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目"成长期中小企业的社会资本动态变迁与非正式融资问题研究--基于广东省的调查分析"(批准号:11YJC840056);广东省社科基金青年项目"社会资本视角下的中小企业非正式融资问题研究"(批准号:GD10YGL16);广州市社科基金项目"社会资本;制度环境与珠三角中小企业非正式融资问题研究"(批准号:09Y03)

摘　　要：广州金融街设置了更高的资金门槛和严格的监管要求,反而吸引了更多的小额贷款公司入驻。企业希望借助政府的高门槛、媒体关注来提升自身的声誉,对声誉的关注也会增加企业的行为自律。进一步研究发现:如果声誉普遍不受重视,企业过往的经营会影响监管机构的判断,企业容易利用公众信任而犯规;如果声誉普遍受到重视,即使高门槛不能保证所有企业守规,政府也不应一开始就严格监管;监管机构应根据声誉的社会重视程度及时调整自身策略。With a higher threshold of funds and stringent regulatory requirements, Guangzhou Financial Street attracted the settlements of more petty-loan companies. Enterprises hope to enhance their reputations by government＇ s high thresholds and media＇ s at- tention and increase their self-disciplines due to concerns for reputation. The further study finds out that if reputation is generally ignored, the past operation of enterprises will affect judgments of the supervision organizations and enterprises tend to make use of the public trust to foul; if reputation is widespread concerned, even if the high threshold can＇ t guarantee all corporate compliances, government will not implement strict supervisions in the beginning; supervision organizations should adjust their strategies in time according to social concerns for reputations.

关 键 词：小额贷款公司 声誉机制 静态博弈 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]