企业寻租与政府的利益输送——基于京东方的案例分析  

The Enterprise Rent-Seeking and Government Fund Transfer——Based on the Case of BOE

作　　者：步丹璐[1] 黄杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2013年第6期135-147,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"高管团队薪酬差距;激励结构和公司价值"(批准号71002111);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"公司风险偏好和管理层激励合同的设计"(批准号09XJC630012)

摘　　要：本文通过研究京东方科技股份有限公司(以下简称京东方)连续获得地方政府支持而扭亏的事件,发现在财政分权的制度背景下,上市公司会利用地方政府的盲目竞争以到相应辖区进行投资为寻租手段,获得地方政府支持,该现象在市场化程度较低的地区更加严重。研究同时发现,京东方获得的政府资助并没有对京东方的业绩起到积极作用,反而使京东方更加依赖于通过无效率投资来寻租扭亏,放松企业业绩经营,市场对企业获得的政府补助也由盲目乐观变得逐渐理性。可见,财政分权体制导致的政府无效率竞争改变了企业的投资行为和目的,而且,政府无效率竞争对地方经济的干预会造成企业对政府的依赖、企业投资的低效、股东的损失,以及社会资金的错配。我们认为,当前如何科学合理地规划地方政府业绩考核制度以实现各个地方政府的理性竞争,是避免为上市公司提供新的寻租方式的前提和基础。Based on the fact that BOE has reversed losses and keeps the qualification as a listed company because of the continuous support of local government, we find that, under the fiscal decentralization regime, listed companies take advantage of the blind competitions among local governments as the rent-seeking approach to obtain the support and right to invest in corresponding jurisdictions. And this phenomenon is seriously obvious in districts with a low level of marketization. Also, BOE does not function well in improving its performances with the help of governmental funding, Instead, it tends to deregulate and rely on invalid investments to inverse deficit. Hence, the market transforms its attitude from blind optimism to gradual rational. In conclusion, under the fiscal decentralization regime, unbridled competitions among local governments cause several serious damages to the local economies, such as then dependency on governments, the inefficiency of investment, the deficits of investors and the losses of whole society. We believe that, it is urgent to consider how to make scientific and reasonable regulations to assess governmental performance and to achieve rational competition among local governments. And also, we believe, new regulations are basis to prevent local governments from providing rent-seeking channels to listed companies.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 企业寻租 非效率投资 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]